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Abstract
Age limits, minimum and maximum, and both explicit and
‘covert’, are still used in the National Health Service to
determine access to a range of health interventions,
including infertility services and cancer screening and treat-
ment. Evidence suggests that chronological age is used as a
proxy for a host of characteristics in determining access to
healthcare: as a proxy for the capacity of an individual to
benefit from an intervention; for the type of harm that may
result from an intervention; for the likelihood of such benefit
or harm occurring; and, in some cases, for other indicators
used to determine what may be in the patient’s interest.
Age is used as a proxy in this way in making decisions about
both individual patients and wider populations; it may be
used where no better ‘marker’ for the relevant characteristic
exists or – for reasons including cost, practicality or fairness
– in preference to other available markers. This article
reviews the justifications for using age in this way in the
context of the existing legal framework on age discrimi-
nation in the provision of public services.
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1 Introduction
Over the past few decades there has been a significant
reduction in the use of age limits as explicit barriers to
access medical treatment, medication or other health-
care services in the UK. Thus, for example, while a
1991 study found 19% of coronary care units used
explicit age-related admissions criteria, by 2001 this had
fallen to less than 1%.1 By 2009, a review commissioned
by the Department of Health found very few remaining
policies that explicitly determined access on the basis of
age.2 Nonetheless, uses of age to determine access do
remain. This article explores the compatibility of some
of these remaining age barriers with UK anti-discrimi-
nation law, which has prohibited age discrimination in
the provision of public services, including healthcare,
since 2012.
* Lecturer University of Reading.
1. Centre for Policy on Ageing, Ageism and Age Discrimination in Secon-
dary Health Care in the United Kingdom (2009). This reduction in the
use of age can be attributed, at least in part, to the introduction of the
(non-legally binding) National Service Framework for Older People, in
2001, which included ‘rooting out age discrimination’ as the first of its
eight standards: Department of Health, National Service Framework for
Older People (2001).
2. I. Carruthers and J. Ormondroyd, Achieving Age Equality in Health and
Social Care: A Report to the Secretary of State for Health (2009).
The article is organised into two halves. The first half
identifies some of the ways in which age is used –
directly or indirectly – to organise access to medical
intervention and treatment, and, as far as is possible,
discusses the reasons age is used in this way. The sec-
ond half assesses whether, and under what conditions,
these uses of age may be permitted within the existing
legal framework and considers how commissioners and
service providers may best ensure that age is used in
ways that are compatible with the law. For this reason
the focus will be on practices that those involved in the
provision of healthcare may plausibly wish to justify.
Although there is also ample evidence of other forms of
age discrimination in healthcare – including widely pub-
licised accounts of neglect – these are not considered
here.
As a preliminary note, it is important to bear in mind
throughout that the use of age to organise and limit
access to services takes place in the context of a publicly
funded health care system with limited resources. It
should also be pointed out that, in most cases rationing
decisions are taken at the local rather than national level.
Policies determining access to treatment are normally
developed at the local level by Clinical Commissioning
Groups (CCGs) although non-binding guidance is set
by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
(NICE.) In some cases – and particularly in relation to
public health programmes such as vaccination and
screening – parameters for access are set nationally. The
implications of both of these issues for the question of
legal justification are discussed in what follows.
2 Uses of Age to Determine
Access to Medical
Intervention
2.1 Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)
QALYs are a measure used to calculate the cost-effec-
tiveness of a particular medical intervention. They com-
bine the (health-related) quality of life a patient may
expect to have post intervention with their remaining
life expectancy. The number of QALYs generated by an
intervention can then be combined with the cost of that
intervention to create a cost-effectiveness ratio – the
cost per QALY. In this way QALYs provide a ‘common
currency’ to allow those with responsibility for resource
allocation to compare the costs and benefits of a range of
interventions and to set priorities accordingly. QALYs
are used to inform decisions about resource allocation by
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NICE, particularly in their evaluation of new and exist-
ing health technologies, and are used more widely in
research that informs commissioning decisions national-
ly and locally.3
There are several ways in which the use of QALYs in
allocating resources may amount to prima facie age
discrimination. First, and much discussed in the aca-
demic literature, is the fact that given the use of remain-
ing life expectancy in the calculation of the number of
QALYs an intervention produces, the method is
potentially indirectly discriminatory. Other things being
equal, a fifty-year-old will normally produce less
QALYs than a thirty-year-old and more than a seventy-
year-old. Further, given the increased likelihood of co-
morbidity (multiple health conditions) in the older
patient, their health-related quality of life is likely to be
lower pre- and post-intervention. This, also, will serve
to reduce the number of QALYs an intervention is
capable of producing.4 For both of these reasons, the
cost per QALY of an intervention for an older patient
will often be higher than the cost per QALY of the same
intervention for a younger patient. When QALYs are
used to inform decisions about which interventions
should be funded, and what the access criteria for inter-
ventions should be, the methodology has the potential to
disadvantage older patients.
This is compounded by concern that the method used
to calculate the health-related quality of life may itself
be indirectly discriminatory by failing to take into
account the experiences and priorities of older patients
and overstating the importance of physical functioning.5
This may lead to underestimation of quality of life in
older people, which, in turn, will impact on the number
of QALYs an intervention is capable of generating in an
older patient.
For these reasons, then, the use of QALYs to inform
resource allocation certainly has the potential to give rise
to indirect discrimination on grounds of age. It is
argued, however, that while this theoretical potential
exists, the context in which QALYs are used in practice
– and in particular their use in health technology
appraisals by NICE – means that the methodology does
not in fact disadvantage older people.6 One reason for
this is that NICE generally operates at a ‘macro’ level –
determining which of a range of possible treatments or
interventions are most cost effective for society as
whole, rather than at an individual level – determining
those members of society who should be eligible for a
3. www.nice.org.uk.
4. The same difficulty is also faced by those with pre-existing disabilities
whose quality of life score may be lower, post intervention, notwith-
standing the success of the intervention itself. See discussion in C. New-
dick, Who Should We Treat? Rights, Rationing and Resources in the
NHS (2005).
5. A. Hickey et al., ‘Measuring Health Related Quality of Life in Older
Patient Populations: A Review of Current Approaches’, 23(10) Pharma-
coeconomics 791-793 (2005); See also R. Edlin et al., Cost Effective-
ness Analysis and Ageism: A Review of the Theoretical Literature
(2008).
6. A. Stevens et al., ‘National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
Appraisal and Ageism’, 38 Journal of Medical Ethics 258-262 (2012).
particular treatment. Because of this, it is claimed, it is
NICE’s normal practice, when evaluating an interven-
tion, to ‘assume that what applies to one age group with-
in a particular appraisal will apply inter alia to others’7
and to aggregate the QALYs an intervention produces
across a range of ages. Thus, most of NICE’s recom-
mendations do not restrict access by age – treatments
are generally recommended for all ages or for none –
and much of the theoretical potential for QALYs to
generate discriminatory results is thereby avoided.
This does not eliminate the potential for discrimination
altogether, however. While there are very few age-strati-
fied results among NICE’s recommendations (where
access to a particular intervention is recommended only
for a particular age group), some do exist;8 and it
remains the case that interventions that would primarily
benefit the older population (rather than society as a
whole) are able to produce fewer QALYs (although, so
far, there are no examples among NICE’s decisions of
interventions being turned down for this reason).9
2.2 In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF)
An example of NICE guidance where recommended
access to treatment is determined by age is IVF. Public
funding for IVF – at any age – is controversial and raises
interesting issues about the boundaries of ‘health’ and
the circumstances in which public funding should be
provided to assist individuals and couples to conceive.10
In February 2013 NICE published revised guidance on
access to IVF and other fertility treatment.11 Among
other recommendations, the revised guidance suggests
that where other clinical criteria are met, women
between the ages of forty and forty-two should be eligi-
ble for one free cycle of IVF treatment, while women
under forty should be offered up to three cycles. Wom-
en aged forty-three and over are not eligible for treat-
ment. There is no lower age limit. The previous recom-
mended lower and upper age limits for access to treat-
ment had been twenty-three and thirty-nine. The
revised guidance was based on an economic model that
used maternal age both as a predictor of the likelihood
of success of treatment and (via a QALY analysis) as a
proxy for the duration of any improvement in the health
state of a couple gained through the IVF treatment.
Local commissioners are not obliged to follow this guid-
ance12 and many currently do not. Some CCGs offer no
funded IVF treatment at all, and others use different age
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. One example – access to IVF – is discussed in more detail later.
9. Edlin, above n. 5, at 72.
10. See, e.g. E. McTernan, ‘Should Fertility Treatment Be State Funded?’,
32(3) Journal of Applied Philosophy 227-240 (2015).
11. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, Fertility: Assess-
ment and Treatment for People with Fertility Problems (February 2013
(updated September 2017), Clinical Guideline 156), https://
www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg156 (last visited January 2020).
12. NICE technology appraisals are binding on local CCGs. However, CCGs
may depart from other forms of NICE Guidance only where they have
good reason to do so (see R v. North Derbyshire Health Authority ex
parte Fisher, [1997] 8 Med. L R 327 and R (on the application of Rose)
v. Thanet Clinical Commissioning Group, [2014] EWHC 1182 (Admin)
discussed further below in relation to proportionality).
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limits to those recommended by NICE, resulting in
what is often termed a postcode lottery.13 The decisions
of (the then) Berkshire East Primary Care Trust to
retain thirty-five as the upper age limit and of (the then)
Portsmouth City Primary Care Trust to make thirty the
lower age limit for access to IVF treatment were both
reported to be subject to possibly the first legal chal-
lenges under the age discrimination provisions of the
Equality Act 2010.14 Since then both CCGs have
removed the lower age limit from their assisted concep-
tion policies, but have retained thirty-five as the upper
age limit for referral for treatment, notwithstanding the
NICE recommendations.15 The minutes of the Board
meeting at which Portsmouth CCG confirmed the
upper age limit (among other eligibility criteria) note
that the decision was taken as a result of the clinical
evidence that the effectiveness of IVF declines after the
age of thirty-five and not because of cost.16 Elsewhere,
lower age limits remain, including, for example, Wilt-
shire CCG, who currently offer IVF only to women
between the ages of thirty and forty.17 The lower limit
in this case is explained as being based on ‘affordability
grounds and prioritising treatment for couples where
the woman is over thirty five when the success rate of
live births begins to decline’.18
2.3 Screening
Several of the few remaining examples of explicit ration-
ing by age within the NHS relate to national screening
programmes. Existing national screening programmes
for adults screen for breast, bowel and cervical cancer
and for vascular disease. All include both upper and
lower age limits for access, although in some cases those
outside the age band are able to request screening tests
despite being excluded from routine screening invita-
13. Neither Croydon nor Cambridge and Peterborough CCGs currently rou-
tinely fund IVF, though this is under review in Cambridge and Peter-
borough: https://www.croydonccg.nhs.uk/get-involved/public-consul
tation-and-engagement/Pages/The-future-of-IVF-services.aspx and
https://www.cambridgeshireandpeterboroughccg.nhs.uk/news-and-
events/latest-news/statement-on-ivf/ (last visited January 2020).
14. L. Donnelly, ‘Couple Sue for IVF in Landmark ‘Age Discrimination’
case’, The Telegraph (London, 1 December 2012), www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/health/news/9716432/Couple-sue-for-IVF-in-landmark-
age-discrimination-case.html; J. Brown and J. Lawrence, ‘Too Young to
Have IVF; 24 Year Old Andrea Heywood Fights for Her Right to Fertility
Treatment’, The Independent (London, 4 June 2012),
www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/
too-young-to-have-ivf-24-year-old-andrea-heywood-fights-for-her-
right-to-fertility-treatment-7814790.html (last visited January 2020).
15. SHIP 8 Clinical Commissioning Groups’ Priorities Committee (South-
ampton, Hampshire, Isle of Wight and Portsmouth CCGs), Policy Rec-
ommendation 002: Assisted Conception Services (September 2014),
www.portsmouthccg.nhs.uk; NHS South, Central and West Commis-
sioning Support Unit, Berkshire East, Policy Statement 11g: Assisted
Reproduction Services for Infertile Couples (November 2013),
www.fundingrequests.cscsu.nhs.uk/berkshire-east/cosmetic-and-other-
surgeries-berkshire-east/ (last visited January 2020).
16. Portsmouth CCG, AI 03 Minutes of Governing Board Meeting of
21 January 2015, 210115, GB180315, item 13, www.portsmouth
ccg.nhs.uk/About-Us/march-2015_2.htm (last visited January 2020).
17. www.wiltshireccg.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/IVF-
policy-2016.09.28.pdf.
18. Ibid.
tions.19 However, where screening is available on
request but not by invitation, there is evidence that
take-up is much lower.
Women between the ages of fifty and seventy are invited
for breast cancer screening every three years. Women
over the age of seventy do not receive an invitation for
screening but are able to request a mammogram every
three years, while those below the age of fifty are able to
access screening only after referral by their general prac-
titioner (GP) for specialist intervention, where, for
example, family history or other clinical factors suggest
this would be beneficial. An extension of this age range
to forty-seven to seventy-three is currently being trial-
led nationwide.20 In 2013 the All Party Parliamentary
Group on Breast Cancer recommended that the trial be
extended to those aged seventy-four to seventy-six and,
should take-up in this age group be sufficient, to those
aged seventy-seven to seventy-nine in a second phase.21
However, in 2015, a follow-up report expressed disap-
pointment that these recommendations had not been
implemented and that while Public Health England
remained supportive in principle, as did healthcare pro-
fessionals, funding remained an issue.22
Bowel Cancer Screening is offered every two years to
those between the ages of sixty and seventy-four and a
new test is currently being introduced for men and
women between fifty-five and sixty with plans to reduce
the lower age limit to fifty in time.23 Cervical cancer
screening is currently offered to women between the
ages of twenty-five and sixty-five, or beyond for those
who have a history of abnormality or who have never
been screened.24 The vascular screening programme is
now available to those between forty and seventy-four.25
In addition to these uses of age limits for access to
screening, it is also worth noting that the UK National
Screening Committee does not currently recommend
prostate cancer screening.26 While this clearly applies to
all age groups, and thus does not involve any direct
discrimination, prostate cancer is a disease that is
particularly prevalent in older men, and thus the deci-
sion not to provide a national screening programme for
this particular cancer is an example of potential indirect
discrimination. It is not easy to find clear explanations
for the use of age limits in each case – or of the particu-
19. There is some minor variation in the upper and lower age limits in Eng-
land, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – the age limits given later
are those that apply in England. Seewww.cancerscreening.nhs.uk.
20. Ibid.
21. All Party Parliamentary Group on Breast Cancer, Age is Just a Number:
The Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry into Older Age and Breast
Cancer (2013).
22. All Party Parliamentary Group on Breast Cancer, Two Years On: Age is
Just Still a Number: Progress Report on the All Party Parliamentary
Group on Breast Cancer’s Enquiry into Older Age and Breast Cancer
(2015).
23. https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/bowel-cancer-screening/ (last visited
January 2020).
24. www.cancerscreening.nhs.uk/cervical/about-cervical-screening.html
(last visited January 2020).
25. www.nhs.uk/Conditions/nhs-health-check/Pages/NHS-Health-
Check.aspx (last visited January 2020).
26. www.cancerscreening.nhs.uk/prostate/ (last visited January 2020).
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lar age limits used – in the available public policy mate-
rials. However, what follows attempts to summarise the
reasons that are provided.
First, the upper and lower age limits chosen may reflect
the evidence on the incidence of the relevant disease in
particular age groups. Chronological age is used as a
proxy for the likelihood of an individual developing the
condition the screening programme is intended to
detect. The national cancer screening website suggests
that the incidence of the disease is the reason for the
upper age limit for cervical cancer screening – ‘General-
ly speaking, the natural history and progression of cervi-
cal cancer means it is highly unlikely that women of 65
and over will go on to develop the disease.’27
Second, even where evidence suggests that those in a
particular age group may be at risk of developing the
condition, screening tests may be unavailable because of
evidence that the screening test itself is likely to be inef-
fective in that age group owing to the changes in the
body associated with changes in age. This appears
particularly relevant in the case of cervical and breast
cancer, where the lower age limits are both justified by
reference to the inability of existing screening tests to
generate reliable results in particular age groups.28
Third, and related, there is concern that, in certain age
groups, the risks and disadvantages of the screening
tests may outweigh the benefits. There is a concern both
that ‘false positives’ (more likely to be generated by
screening in age groups where the screening test is less
reliable) may increase anxiety and lead to unnecessary
and potentially harmful treatment and that ‘true posi-
tives’ may likewise result in avoidable anxiety and inter-
vention where the age of the patient and the normal pro-
gression of the disease mean that the disease would be
unlikely to manifest itself naturally during the lifetime
of the patient. Thus, a review of the lower age limit for
cervical cancer concluded that extending testing to
women below the age of twenty-five could lead to
adverse psychological impacts and to an increase in
unnecessary treatment, which in turn could have harm-
ful side effects in relation to future childbearing.29 Simi-
larly, for both bowel30 and prostate31 cancer screening it
has been argued that, given that most older patients in
whom screening would detect cancer are likely to die of
something else before the cancer reaches its advanced
stages, the negative impacts of screening in older age
outweigh the benefits.
27. www.cancerscreening.nhs.uk/cervical/faqs.html (last visited January
2020).
28. www.cancerscreening.nhs.uk/breastscreen/faqs.html (last visited Janu-
ary 2020).
29. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Cervical Screening, 19 May
2009, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150505172923/
http://www.cancerscreening.nhs.uk/cervical/cervical-review-
minutes-20090519.pdf (last visited January 2020).
30. C. Quarini and M. Gosney, ‘Review of Evidence for a Colorectal Cancer
Screening Programme in Elderly People’, 38(5) Age and Ageing
503-508 (2009).
31. D. Burford et al., Prostate Cancer Risk Management Programme; Infor-
mation for Primary Care: PSA Testing in Asymptomatic Men: Evidence
Document (NHS Cancer Screening Programmes) (2010).
Fourthly, it has been argued, at least in relation to cervi-
cal cancer screening, that using age as the entry point
into the screening programme, rather than determining
when screening is appropriate for an individual patient
based on other factors, ensures that the system is fair,
consistent and workable. There was a real danger of
stigmatising women if the first screen was to be based
on sexual activity or smoking – lifestyle-based risk fac-
tors that would, in fact, be the best indicator for when
the first cervical screen would be beneficial.32
Finally, there is cost-effectiveness. The national screen-
ing programmes do not come under the auspices of
NICE guidance, and there is no clear explanation of
how cost-effectiveness is determined in relation to the
various screening programmes or of how information on
cost-effectiveness is then used in decision-making in
relation to age limits. Clearly, many of the other reasons
discussed previously are relevant to cost-effectiveness.
Research on cost-effectiveness is certainly evident in
research that informs the decisions about the ages at
which the various screening programmes should be
offered. Thus, in relation to the lower age limit for vas-
cular screening, and upper and lower age limits for
breast cancer screening, QALYs were used to model the
cost-effectiveness of a range of lower age limits.33
2.4 Mental Health Services
Age discrimination in mental health services has been
the subject of recent research and political focus. Weak-
nesses in mental health provision are particularly likely
to affect the older population: 30% of mental health
inpatients are aged over sixty-five.34 It is clear that some
of the failures in provision of mental health services in
the older population are the result of ageist stereotypes
or misconceptions – a view of mental health problems
such as depression or dementia as a ‘normal’ part of age-
ing, for example.35 However, an important cause is nor-
mally identified as stemming from the segregation of
mental health service provision for working age and old-
er adults; in many (though not all) localities, mental
health services are divided into ‘adult mental health’ for
adults up to the age of (usually) 65 and ‘older people’s
mental health’ for those over sixty-five.36 While this
division was originally intended to offer better and spe-
cialised services to those in different age groups, reflect-
32. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Cervical Screening, above n. 29,
at 7.2.
33. Department of Health, Putting Prevention First – Vascular Checks: Risk
Assessment and Management (2008); A. Rawdin and J. Madan, An Ini-
tial Assessment of the Merits of Extending Breast Cancer Screening
Aged 47-49 Years to Assist the Appraisal of Options for Extending the
NHSBSP with Appendix Considering Women Aged 71-73 (2008).
34. Healthcare Commission, Count Me in 2008: Results of the 2008
National Census of Inpatients in Mental Health and Learning Disability
Services in England and Wales (2008).
35. Centre for Policy on Ageing, above n. 1. Royal College of Psychiatrists,
Suffering in Silence: Age Inequality in Older People’s Mental Health
Care (College Report 221) (2018).
36. Ibid. Mental health provision for children and adolescents is also organ-
ised as separate services but will not be discussed here. Under-18s are
not covered by the age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act
2010.
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ing the (often) different health needs of each group, the
implementation of the segregated services is generally
agreed to have resulted in poorer services for the older
group. In 2009, a consultation by the Government
Equalities Office found that in some trusts older people
were unable to access services that were available to
younger adults.37 Thus, while working age adults in
some areas are able to access services such as crisis care,
out of hours and occupational health, older adults are
not.38 For some patients this means that once they reach
sixty-five they are transferred from the care of adult
mental health to older people’s mental health services
and thereby excluded from services from which they
had previously benefited. These – among other – fea-
tures of the difference in service provision have led
some commentators to conclude that ‘mental health ser-
vices in the NHS provide one of the few remaining
examples, in many localities, of overt, institutional
direct age discrimination’.39
However, while most agree that current divergence in
the quality and quantity of service provision is unac-
ceptable, there is debate over whether the solution lies
in integrated or segregated-but-better services. One rea-
son for the initial segregation of services was that the
profile of mental health problems in the working age
and the older populations is significantly different. In
particular, as adults reach later life, there is a decline in
the prevalence of psychoses and a rise in dementia, with
dementia accounting for over one-third of hospital men-
tal health patients aged sixty-five and over, and over half
of those aged seventy-five and over.40 Further, accord-
ing to the Royal College of Psychiatrists, older people
may develop mental health problems related to social
and lifestyle changes brought about by ageing, which
require a specialised response.41 Age is therefore agreed
to be a good proxy for mental health needs.
The different mental health needs that may arise in the
older population have led to calls to retain – but
improve – separate service provision for older people.
Indeed, there is a concern that failure to do so could
itself amount to (indirect) age discrimination by failing
to recognise and respond appropriately to the needs of
the older population. Thus, the Department of Health,
following a consultation on this issue, concluded that
specialist older people’s mental health services should
continue because the ageing population has particular
needs; many adult mental health services are designed to
meet the needs of working age adults with severe mental
health problems and would fail to meet the needs of old-
er adults with different conditions. The conclusion was
that what was needed were specialist services of equiva-
37. Government Equalities Office, Equality Bill: Making It Work. Ending
Age Discrimination in Services and Public Functions – A Consultation
(2009).
38. Centre for Policy on Ageing, above n. 1.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Royal College of Psychiatrists, above n. 35.
lent quality.42 Similarly, the Royal College of Psychia-
trists, while arguing that an arbitrary age limit should
not be used to determine the services a person is entitled
to receive, were clear that age-appropriate mental age
services should be retained:
it is unacceptable to offer a single, age inclusive men-
tal health service that is not designed to meet the
need of older people and to do so would be discrimi-
nation.43
Solutions have been suggested and, in some places,
implemented that attempt to retain age-appropriate ser-
vices without using chronological age as the (only) crite-
rion for determining access. These include formal
agreements between working age and older adult mental
health services that provide – for example – for reassess-
ment of mental health needs at 65, rather than automatic
transfer.44 However, it appears that there is no consen-
sus on whether older people’s mental health services
should be organised as a separate service.45
2.5 Non-overt Discrimination
The previous sections have assessed some of the few
remaining examples of explicit age differentiation in
access to services. In addition to these examples of
explicit use as age as a criterion for access to services,
there is evidence that age serves as a factor in determin-
ing whether and which services to offer in a wide range
of situations involving individual clinical judgment. Age
appears to affect preventative care, the likelihood of
investigation and referral and the type of care and treat-
ment subsequently available, across a range of speciali-
ties.
A clear example is in the case of cancer services. Most
cancers are more prevalent in later life. Over half of all
cancers diagnosed are in people aged sixty-five or over;
a third of all cancers diagnosed are in those aged seven-
ty-five or over.46 Despite this age profile, however, a
2012 study by the Department of Health concluded that
there is a marked decline in referral for more ‘intensive’
treatment – including surgical intervention – as patient
age increases. Thus, for example, the incidence of breast
cancer peaks in the 85-plus age group, but surgical
intervention for breast cancer declines sharply after the
age of seventy.47 This is despite the relevant NICE
guideline, which is explicit that surgical intervention
should be offered regardless of chronological age.48 The
42. Department of Health, New Horizons: Towards a Shared Vision for
Mental Health – A Consultation (2009).
43. Royal College of Psychiatrists, Age Discrimination in Mental Health
Services: Making Equality a Reality (position statement PS2/2009)
(2009).
44. Centre for Policy on Ageing, above n. 1.
45. Ibid.
46. Department of Health, The Impact of Patient Age on Clinical Decision
Making in Oncology (2012). See also Royal College of Surgeons,
Access All Ages: Assessing the Impact of Age on Access to Surgical
Treatments (2013).
47. Ibid. Department of Health.
48. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, Clinical Guidance
for Early and Locally Advanced Breast Cancer (CG80) (2009).
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low rate of surgical intervention is thought to be one of
the reasons cancer outcomes in those over the age of
seventy-five may be poorer in the UK than in other
comparable countries. The study concluded that, in
making decisions about access to oncology services, and,
in particular, in determining the level of intensity of the
treatment that should be provided ‘clinicians may over
rely on chronological age as a proxy for other factors
which are often but not necessarily associated with age,
such as comorbidities or frailty’.49 Similar patterns
emerge in respect of other service, including cardiology,
stroke and mental health.50
Clinical assessment of a patient on the basis of chrono-
logical age – rather than on the basis of actual frailty, co-
morbidity and polypharmacy – may, of course, involve
unwarranted ‘ageist’ judgments such as, for example,
mistaken assumptions about the preferences or lifestyle
needs of an individual patient. It may also involve the
use of chronological age as a proxy for the risks and
harms a course of treatment may produce in an individ-
ual patient where, for example, there is a strong statisti-
cal correlation between age and risk and no reliable test
for assessing biological age.51 There is relatively little
research on the ways in which age is used by individual
clinicians, but that which there is suggests that chrono-
logical age may be used as a proxy for a number of indi-
cators, including risk or capacity to benefit. Thus, for
example, some clinicians participating in a study of the
influence of patient age on decision-making on coronary
care noted that a patient’s chronological age may influ-
ence their views on whether to refer them for surgery as
it served as a proxy for the risk of mortality or the devel-
opment of complications. Some clinicians in the same
study also used patient age as a marker for wider con-
cerns about what may be in the patient’s best interests.
One, for example, noted that ‘they wouldn’t want an
angiogram if they were over 70’; another, that ‘I don’t
think bypass surgery in an 87 year old is in their inter-
ests’.52
2.6 Summary
The foregoing review suggests that chronological age is
used as a proxy for a host of characteristics in determin-
ing access to treatment: as a proxy for the capacity of an
individual to benefit from an intervention; for the type
of harm that may result from an intervention; for the
likelihood of such benefit or harm occurring; and, in
some cases, for other indicators used to determine what
may be in the patient’s interest. Age is used as a proxy
in this way in making decisions about both individual
patients and wider populations; it may be used where no
49. Department of Health, above n. 46.
50. Royal College of Surgeons, above n. 46; Royal College of Psychiatrists,
above n. 35.
51. See e.g. Department of Health, above note 46, which suggests that the
lack of an objective way of assessing biological age in some contexts
may lead to clinicians using chronological age as a proxy.
52. C. Harries et al., ‘Which Doctors are Influenced by a Patient’s Age? A
Multi Method Study of Angina Treatment in General Practice, Cardiolo-
gy and Gerontology’, 16 Quality and Safety in Health Care 23-27
(2007).
better ‘marker’ for the relevant characteristic exists or
where – for reasons including cost, practicality or fair-
ness – age may be used in preference to other available
markers. The next section now considers how these
reasons for using age may fit with existing anti-discrimi-
nation law.
3 Legislative Framework
Under the Equality Act, service providers must not dis-
criminate directly or indirectly on grounds of age. How-
ever, they may adopt measures that would otherwise
amount to direct or indirect age discrimination if they
can show that the measure in question is a ‘proportion-
ate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’53
There have, as yet, been no reported cases on age discri-
mination in the provision of healthcare. In order to
understand the way the justification may operate in this
context, therefore, we must look to other case law for
guidance on the likely approach to be taken by the
courts on the scope of the test for justification. A num-
ber of sources are likely to be particularly helpful.
The first is the case law on age discrimination in
employment where a significant body of case law has
emerged both in the UK and in the European Court of
Justice (CJEU). There has been some judicial considera-
tion of whether the meaning of discrimination, and the
approach to interpretation to be taken by the Court,
should be the same across the various areas of life
regulated by anti-discrimination law. Thus, by way of
example, the House of Lords, in the disability discrimi-
nation case of Lewisham v. Malcolm, concluded that the
test for establishing ‘disability related discrimination’
must mean the same in relation to housing and to
employment, despite the different overall scheme of the
different sections of the (then) Disability Discrimination
Act 1995.54 Likewise, in Elias, a case concerning indirect
race discrimination the administration of a government
compensation scheme for prisoners of war, it was held
that the appropriate test of proportionality under the
1976 Race Relations Act was that developed by the
CJEU in Bilka in the context of a claim of sex discrimi-
nation in the workplace, even though the claim in Elias
was not one to which EU anti-discrimination law
applied.55 There is therefore good reason to think that
the approach developed to justification in the case law
on age discrimination in employment, both in the UK
Courts and in the CJEU, will inform the approach taken
to discrimination in healthcare.
A second useful source is case law on discrimination in
public services, both under the Equality Act 2010
(where, again, case law is very limited) and under Art-
icle 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR.) The ECHR has not proved fruitful territory in
53. Sections 13 and 19.
54. Malcolm v. Lewisham LBC, [2008] UKHL 43.
55. R. (on the application of Elias) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2006]
EWCA Civ 1293.
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establishing a positive right to healthcare treatment –
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) having
confirmed in Senteges and in Pentiacova56 that Article 8
is generally not engaged in situations that involve a deci-
sion not to provide a particular form of treatment.
Indeed in the UK case of Condliff the Court of Appeal
noted that
[a]lthough the Strasbourg Court has recognised that
in principle Article 8 may be relied on to impose a
positive obligation on a state to take measures to pro-
vide support for an individual, including medical
support, there is no reported case in which the court
has upheld such a claim by an individual complaining
of the state’s non-provision of medical treatment.57
As a result, there is very little that can be said with con-
fidence about the obligations of healthcare providers in
relation to Article 14, and the implications for the inter-
pretation of the Equality Act. Nonetheless, ECHR case
law will be instructive in relation to approaches to age
discrimination and to the bounds of permissible justifi-
cation in relation to the provision of public services and
the allocation of scarce resources.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that
courts have often tended to treat age differently from
other protected grounds of discrimination and to engage
in lighter touch review of justification in consequence.58
Thus, for example, in consideration of Gurkha pensions
entitlements in the Court of Appeal, Kay LJ decided
that ‘stronger justification’ would be required for discri-
mination on grounds of nationality than it was on
grounds of age. Nationality was a suspect ground,
whereas age was not. Arguments by the counsel for the
appellants that age should be given ‘suspect’ status
because ‘it is innate, unalterable, closely connected with
personal development and central to a person’s individ-
uality’ were rejected as unsupported by domestic or
Strasbourg authority.59 In Carson age was identified as a
‘contemporary example of a borderline case’ between
these two categories of ‘suspect’ and ‘non-suspect’ char-
acteristics.60 It is therefore difficult to be confident in
assessing the extent to which judicial reasoning on other
grounds of discrimination will be relevant to cases on
age.
With those caveats in mind, the next two sections will
assess the way the test for justification may apply to the
instances of potential age discrimination identified pre-
viously – first, by considering whether the aims given
56. Sentges v. Netherlands, [2004] 7 CCL Rep 400; Pentiacova v. Moldova,
[2005] 40 EHRR SE23.
57. R (on the application of Condliff) v. North Staffordshire Primary Care
Trust, [2011] EWCA Civ 910, at 41.
58. For discussion see R. Horton, ‘Justifying Age Discrimination in the EU’,
in U. Belavusau and K. Henrard (eds.), EU Anti-Discrimination Law
Beyond Gender (2018) and S. Goosey, ‘Is Age Discrimination a Less
Serious Form of Discrimination?’, Legal Studies 1-17 (2019).
59. R (British Gurkha Welfare Society and Others) v. Ministry of Defence,
[2010] EWCA Civ 1098, at 11.
60. R (on the application of Carson) v. Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions and R (on the application of Reynolds) v. Secretary of State
for Work and Pensions, [2006] 1 AC 173.
for the uses of age are likely to be ‘legitimate’ and, sec-
ond, by assessing whether using age boundaries is likely
to be a proportionate means to achieve them.
3.1 Legitimate Aims
3.1.1 Cost-effectiveness
Behind many decisions to restrict access to health inter-
ventions, however this is done, is of course the need to
ration limited resources. The use of age to determine
access is no different. It was seen earlier that behind the
restriction on IVF services and screening programmes
by age, and indeed the design of the QALY methodolo-
gy, is a desire to allocate resources cost-effectively.
In a public law context, as Herring notes, challenges to
healthcare rationing decisions in the UK are rarely suc-
cessful: courts are unwilling to intervene where issues of
resource allocation are concerned unless manifestly irra-
tional.61 Where judicial review succeeds it tends to be on
procedural grounds rather than because a refusal of any
particular treatment is substantively unfair. This is the
case even where the treatment involved is potentially
life-saving.62 Where challenges have succeeded they
have tended to involve procedural failures such as, for
example, a failure to adequately define what would con-
stitute an exceptionality in relation to the refusal to pro-
vide an expensive cancer drug63 or a policy that allowed
no room for the exercise of discretion and consideration
of individual facts in relation to gender reassignment
surgery64 – matters that, in a discrimination law context
would more likely fall to be determined under the ques-
tion of proportionate means, discussed later.
Is the approach of the courts likely to be any different
when considering justification of age discrimination
under the Equality Act? We know that in an employ-
ment law context, cost saving, without more, is unlikely
to amount to legitimate aim – employers may not engage
in discriminatory behaviour simply because it is cheaper
to do so. However, courts have treated aims expressed
in terms of prudent use of resources more sympatheti-
cally. Thus, while the Court of Appeal in Woodcock
agreed that ‘considerations based on cost alone, or on
economic or financial factors alone, cannot justify treat-
ment that is discriminatory on grounds of age’,65 subse-
quent cases have noted that it is ‘legitimate for an organ-
isation to seek to break even year on year and to make
decisions about the allocation of its resources’.66 The
CJEU has made similar comments.67
61. J. Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (2012). See also Newdick, above n.
4; C. Foster, ‘Simple Rationality? The Law of Healthcare Resource Allo-
cation in England’, 33 Journal of Medical Ethics 404-407 (2007).
62. R v. Cambridge Health Authority ex parte B, [1995] 2 All ER 129, CA.
63. R (on the application of Rogers) v. Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust
and another, [2006] EWCA Civ 392.
64. R v. North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex p A, D & G, [2001] 1
WLR 977.
65. Woodcock v. Cumbria PCT, [2012] EWCA Civ 330, at 55.
66. See, most recently Heskett v. Secretary of State for Justice, [2019]
UKEAT/0149/18/DA, at 25.
67. See Case C159/10 Fuchs and another v. Land Hessen, [2011] 3 CMLR
47.
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Against this background, then, it is difficult to imagine
courts challenging the aims of targeting scarce resources
most efficiently to those most likely to benefit. Any
challenge is more likely to arise in relation to the means
chosen to do so.
3.1.2 Protection of Patients
More difficult, perhaps, are those aims, identified previ-
ously, that aim to protect patients from some form of
distress. It will be remembered that these kinds of
reasons featured in the justification for the upper and
lower ages for access to screening, where decision mak-
ers expressed a preference to shield patients from the
distress of ‘false positives’ or of ‘true positives’ where
the progress of the disease meant individuals were likely
to die of something else before the cancer became fatal.
There was also a desire to protect young women from
the stigma of invitations to screening for cervical cancer
based on lifestyle. Reasoning based on the assumed
wishes or interests of older patients was also evident in
the limited evidence available on the ways in which
clinicians may use age in deciding on the most appropri-
ate treatment pathway.
The UK Supreme Court did accept an – arguably –
comparable reason as a legitimate aim in Seldon68 fol-
lowing the guidance of the CJEU. Mr Seldon, a solicitor
and partner in the respondent law firm, had been
required to retire from the partnership at the age of six-
ty-five. The respondent firm claimed that their treat-
ment of Mr Seldon was justified by a number of aims,
one of which was to limit the need to expel partners by
way of performance management, thus contributing to a
congenial and supportive culture in the respondent
firm. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court,
this aim was expressed in terms of a concern for pre-
serving the dignity of the individual partner or employ-
ee by avoiding potentially humiliating performance
management and disputes about competence. The
Supreme Court was unanimous that this aim, among
others, was legitimate and indeed had been held to be so
by the CJEU.
This decision (and this feature of it in particular) have
proved controversial, not least because it rests on
assumptions about what older people may want and who
is best placed to decide this.69 While avoiding perform-
ance management and disputes is likely to be in the
interests of the employer, the aim was also expressed as
being to ensure the best outcome for employees. Thus,
it seemed to reinforce a stereotype of older people as
being not only more vulnerable to potentially humiliat-
ing capability proceedings and in need of protection
from them but also as not best placed to choose for
themselves whether or not to remain in the workplace
and to risk a capability assessment at some point in the
future. Age UK, intervening in Seldon, had argued that
the dignity of each individual was the philosophy under-
68. Seldon v. Clarkson Wright & Jakes (A Partnership), [2012] UKSC 16.
69. See A. Blackham, ‘Interrogating the ‘Dignity’ Argument for Mandatory
Retirement: An Undignified Development?’, 48(3) Industrial Law Jour-
nal 377-415 (2019).
lying all the anti-discrimination laws and that this
amounted to a right not to be treated on the basis of
stereotypical assumptions. Dignity included respect for
the autonomy.70 Lady Hale expressed some sympathy
with this position, but she concluded that the CJEU’s
acceptance of dispute avoidance/preserving dignity as a
legitimate aim was the end of the matter.
While there is reason, therefore, to believe such aims
may be considered legitimate, they are perhaps more
vulnerable to challenge. This may be particularly the
case in relation to decision-making by clinicians in
respect of individual patients. In related areas of law
regulating the doctor-patient relationship, such as
informed consent, there has been, in recent years, a
marked move away from ‘medical paternalism’ and
towards patient autonomy; doctors may not withhold
information from patients for fear of causing them dis-
tress unless in exceptional circumstances and may cer-
tainly not do so in order to prevent ‘the patient from
making an informed choice…which the doctor consid-
ers to be contrary to her best interests’.71
3.1.3 Meeting the Needs of Different Groups
In relation to mental health services, it is evident from
the foregoing discussion that there is an ongoing debate
over whether age-specialist services are appropriate and
indeed whether a failure to provide age-specialised ser-
vices may create disadvantage to older patients such as
to amount to indirect discrimination.
Targeting services to particular groups in order to meet
need is very likely to amount to a legitimate aim. In
respect of other characteristics – where no justification
for what may otherwise amount to direct discrimination
is permitted – the Equality Act includes exceptions that
permit different treatment in specified circumstances.
For example, the provision of separate services to differ-
ent sexes is permitted where it can be shown that a joint
service would be less effective and the provision
amounts to a proportionate means of achieving a legiti-
mate aim. The positive action provisions of the Act also
permit different treatment for groups sharing a protect-
ed characteristic where it is shown that the aim of the
treatment is to meet the needs of the relevant group or
to overcome disadvantage connected to the characteris-
tic and the treatment is a proportionate means of achiev-
ing that aim.
In relation to age discrimination in employment, both
the CJEU and the UK courts have been happy to accept
as legitimate aims that relate to redressing disadvantage
faced by particular age groups in the labour market
and/or improving intergenerational equity.
There seems little doubt, therefore, that an objective of
improving services for a particular age group will be
legitimate and the provision of age-specialised services
will be justified provided the means of achieving the aim
are proportionate.
70. Submission of Age UK (Second Intervener), at 31.
71. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board, [2015] UKSC 11, at 91.
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3.2 Proportionality
Once a legitimate aim has been established as a first
step, the test for proportionality, although not always
applied wholly consistently,72 tends to consist of three
further steps. Second and third – as drawn from the
case law of the CJEU going back to Bilka – are the ques-
tions of whether the chosen measure is appropriate for
achieving the chosen objective and no more than neces-
sary to accomplish it. However, as recently noted by
Lady Hale,
[t]he concept of proportionality, which has found its
way into both the law of the European Union and the
European Convention on Human Rights, has always
contained a fourth element. This is the importance,
at the end of the exercise, of the overall balance
between the ends and the means: there are some sit-
uations in which the ends, however meritorious, can-
not justify the only means which is capable of achiev-
ing them.73
This section assesses whether it is possible to identify a
number of features that case law suggests may be rele-
vant to determining whether and when the use of age as
a proxy criterion in accessing healthcare intervention is
proportionate. These features are the accuracy of the
proxy and – related – the impact on those excluded; the
availability of an alternative – less discriminatory – test;
and whether there is scope for considering whether an
exception to a rule should be made in the case of a par-
ticular individual.
3.2.1 Accuracy
Courts have rejected the use of some protected charac-
teristics, including sex and race, as proxies, even where
their use has been statistically well evidenced. In Test
Achats, for example, the use of sex as a proxy for risk in
calculating motor insurance premiums was rejected even
though this could be substantiated by accurate actuarial
and statistical data.74 In relation to age, however, courts
have appeared far more prepared to accept the use of
age as a proxy, in principle at least. In these cases the
question of the accuracy of the proxy then becomes
potentially relevant to the question of proportionality.
Accuracy should matter in proportionality assessment.
The less accurate the proxy, the more people are likely
to be on the ‘wrong side’ of the line and excluded from
access to the benefit in question. Along with the nature
of any hardship caused – which will also depend on the
nature of the benefit to which access is denied – the
accuracy of the proxy will be one of the considerations
relevant to balancing the aim of the measure against the
impact on those affected.
72. A. Baker, ‘Proportionality and Employment Discrimination in the UK’,
37(4) Industrial Law Journal 305-328 (2008).
73. Akerman-Livingstone v. Aster Communities Ltd, [2015] UKSC 15, at
28.
74. Case C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats
ASBL and Others v. Conseil des ministres, [2011] 5 CMLR 36; see also
Timishev v. Russia, [2007] 44 EHRR 37 on the use of race as a proxy.
The CJEU has been prepared to challenge the accuracy
of the use of age as a proxy in a number of cases.75 In
Hennigs the Court found the use of an age-gradated pay
scheme to be unjustified. It rejected the argument that
older workers had greater financial needs than younger
workers, noting that
it has not been shown that there is a direct correlation
between the age of employees and their financial
needs. Thus a young employee may have substantial
family burdens to bear while an older employee may
be unmarried without dependant children.76
Presumably, had a direct correlation been established,
the Court would have taken a different view. In Prigge
the Court was asked to consider a rule in a collective
agreement requiring compulsory retirement of airline
pilots at sixty, where age was used as a proxy for a
decline in the physical capacities needed to perform the
role safely.77 While not challenging the argument that
age can stand as a proxy for physical capacity, the Court
found the choice of sixty to be disproportionate in this
case because there was no evidence to support it.
National and international legislation permitted pilots to
continue working in certain circumstances until sixty-
five, and no evidence had been provided to justify a
departure from this standard.
Evidence aside, the use of age as a proxy in relation to
health is always going to present difficulties with regard
to accuracy in relation to health for at least two reasons.
First, there is a widely acknowledged difference
between ‘chronological age’ and ‘biological age.’ Grim-
ley Evans has argued that chronological age does not
serve as an accurate proxy for health-related risks or
capacity to benefit, because there can be wide variance
between the chronological age of an individual and their
biological age; and because even though there may be
correlation between age and health, age is not the cause
of anything:
We have grown so inured to using a patient’s age as
an excuse for laziness in investigating him or her
properly that we have failed to build into our scientif-
ic paradigms proper identification of the true physio-
logical determinants of outcome… If one knows
enough about the physiological condition of the
patient, age should drop off the end of the predictive
equation for outcome.78
Second, even where chronological age does serve as a
good proxy for some other characteristic, it is difficult to
imagine that it can ever adequately capture all and only
those having that characteristic, because, as the House
75. However not consistently so. See, for example Kucukdeveci v. Swedex
GmbH & Co KG, [2010] 2 CMLR 33.
76. C-297/10 Hennigs v. Eisenbahn-Bundesamtat, [2012] 1 CMLR 18, at
70.
77. C-447/09 Prigge v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG EU:C:2011:573.
78. J. Grimley Evans, ‘Age Discrimination: Implications of the Ageing Pro-
cess’, in S. Fredman and S. Spencer (eds.), Age as an Equality Issue
(2003), at 19-20.
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of Lords accepted in Carson and Reynolds, ‘there could
be no relevant difference between a person the day
before and the day after his or her birthday’.79 In that
case the House of Lords considered whether a provision
restricting certain social security benefits to those under
the age of twenty-five was in breach of Article 14 of the
ECHR. Finding that the use of age was a relevant proxy
for financial need (the government had argued that
many more under twenty-fives lived with their families
or in shared accommodation and therefore had lower
expenses), the Court accepted that the choice of any
particular age here could only ever be an ‘arbitrary line’.
However, it was argued,
[A] line must be drawn somewhere. All that is neces-
sary is that it should reflect a difference between the
substantial majority of the people on either side of the
line.80
In relation to the examples of the use of age, above,
there is certainly cause for concern about the accuracy of
the age limits chosen in some cases. A review of the lit-
erature on the use of age in access to screening pro-
grammes concluded that
while some (screening programmes) have a sound
evidence base and for others there is no available
evidence, some are clearly discriminatory and are not
justifiable by disease prevalence or any other clinical
indicator.81
Thus, for example, while the upper age limit for vascu-
lar screening is currently seventy-four, most strokes
occur in those aged seventy-five or over, and therefore it
is important to monitor hypertension in this age group
too;82 and the upper age limit for cervical cancer screen-
ing is explained – as noted previously – as reflecting the
fact that those over sixty-five are ‘highly unlikely to go
on to develop the disease’, whereas research suggests
that more women in their seventies die from cervical
cancer than women under thirty and that there is a sec-
ond ‘peak’ in the incidence of cervical cancer in those
over the age of eighty-five.83 Thus, the proportionality
of the choice of the current age limits certainly seem
open to challenge for this reason.
It is also interesting to consider how this might apply in
relation to the ‘postcode lottery’ for access to IVF ser-
vices. It was seen that different age limits for access are
used by different CCGs and that many depart in this
respect from the guidance on age limits issued by NICE.
In respect of their public law obligations, it was held in
Rose v. Thanet that while CCGs are not obliged to fol-
low NICE guidance, they must have regard to them and
must provide clear reasons for departing from them.
79. R (on the application of Carson), [2006] 1 AC 173, at 41.
80. Ibid.
81. Centre for Policy on Ageing, above n. 1, at 22.
82. G. Xavier, ‘The New Health Checks Must Not Be Allowed to Increase
Inequalities’, 105(14) Nursing Times 9 (2009).
83. C. White, ‘Upper Age Limit Should be Raised for Cancer Screening’,
318 British Medical Journal 831 (1999); www.cancerresearchuk.org.
Notably, it was held that they will be in breach of their
public law obligations should they depart from the guid-
ance solely on the basis of disagreement with NICE over
the current state of medical science. A similar obligation
could be argued to exist in relation to justifying the
choice of a particular age limit for IVF. It was seen that
in Prigge a departure from internationally accepted age
limit for pilots, without good reason, was a reason for
finding the relevant measure disproportionate. Like-
wise, given NICE’s conclusions on the effectiveness of
IVF in particular age groups, CCGs may be argued to
be acting disproportionately, taking a different view on
this issue and choosing different age limits accordingly.
A choice of different age limits should therefore be jus-
tified by reference to other reasons relevant to local
needs and priorities.
3.2.2 Availability of Less Discriminatory Measure
Given that a measure must be ‘necessary’ in order to be
proportionate, the existence of a less discriminatory
alternative to the use of a particular age limit may signal
that the measure in question is not proportionate. An
alternative measure may include using a different crite-
rion (which may include, for age, a different age limit),
testing each individual to see whether those concerned
do indeed possess the necessary characteristics to quali-
fy for whatever benefit is at stake, or asking individuals
about their preferences.
The CJEU has not been consistent in its approach to
this issue. There was no suggestion, for example, in
Petersen, that the use of age to determine when a dentist
was no longer safe to practise was disproportionate
because it could have been replaced by an individual fit-
ness to practise test, administered to all dentists.84 How-
ever, in Vital Perez the CJEU took a different view in
considering a measure that set a maximum recruitment
age of thirty for a local Spanish police force in order to
guarantee a certain level of physical capacity among
recruits.85 The Court rejected the measure as dispropor-
tionate because the use of an age limit to achieve the aim
here was unnecessary – the police force already used
stringent physical tests as part of the recruitment pro-
cess. This made the use of the age limit unnecessary to
establish the aim and therefore disproportionate.
In relation to Article 14, it has been suggested that
‘necessity’ is neither necessary nor sufficient but instead
is simply one of the ‘tools of analysis in examining the
cogency of the reasons put forward in justification of a
measure’.86 At least in relation to non-suspect catego-
ries, it seems, the existence of a less discriminatory
alternative does not mean a measure will fail the propor-
tionality test; and the administrative workability and
cost of alternatives are certainly relevant. Bibi, for
example, concerned the application of a language test to
applicants for long-term residence. Nationality was used
84. C-341/08 Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss fur Zahnarzte fur den Bezirk
Westfalen-Lippe, [2010] 2 CMLR 31.
85. C-416/13 Vital Perez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo EU C:2014:2109.
86. R (on the application of Wilson) v. Wychavon DC, [2007] EWCA Civ
52.
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as a proxy to determine who should be exempt from the
test and who should not – nationals from English-speak-
ing countries were exempt. The possibility of an alter-
native approach, including individual testing, was con-
sidered. The Court held that
it would be absurd to suggest that a person should
have to undergo a test to prove that he or she meets
the language requirement in order that he or she
should be entitled to benefit from an exemption from
the requirement to undergo a language test… in this
context, it is administratively sensible and permissi-
ble to draw relatively ‘broad’ or ‘bright’ lines in terms
of selecting those who can be considered as already
sufficiently meeting the requirement to justify being
exempted from the provision. What is necessary is
that the particular ‘bright line’ adopted be a rational
one.87
Likewise, even where a feasible alternative test is con-
ceivable, the cost and administrative inconvenience
involved may incline the Court to decide that a failure to
choose the alternative was not disproportionate.88
Interestingly, in Seldon, age was used as a proxy, among
other things, for declining capacity. The argument was
that the mandatory retirement age in question was justi-
fied as a means of preserving the dignity of older work-
ers by preventing their dismissal for incapacity. There
was a notable and somewhat frustrating lack of discus-
sion on this issue in the case, which makes conclusions
harder to draw. However, it was accepted that age
should be used as a proxy for declining capacity in order
to avoid an actual capacity test. The purpose of the age
limit was to protect individuals from this assumed
humiliation. Thus, the nature of the alternative test was
deemed a reason to find the measure proportionate.
The theoretical possibility of testing each individual
rather than applying an age limit is therefore unlikely to
be enough to make the use of an age limit disproportion-
ate. Rather, the cost and workability of administering
individual testing will be relevant to a determination of
proportionality – particularly where, it is imagined, the
legitimate aim in question involves the efficient target-
ing of scarce resources. Thus, for example, in relation to
cancer screening, analogous with Bibi, if screening can-
not be available to everybody then the use of individual
testing to determine access to screening makes little
sense. However, in cases where individual assessment
does not incur significant costs or present other signifi-
cant difficulties – and in particular, where individual
assessment is already undertaken (as was the case in
Vital Perez) – then a case might be made that the impo-
sition of age limits is unnecessary and therefore dispro-
portionate. This is likely to be the case in relation to the
use of age by individual clinicians. Chronological age
87. R (Bibi) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2013] EWCA
Civ 322, at 42 citing J. Beatson, at first instance, [2011] EWHC 3370
(Admin), at 132.
88. R (on the application of Hooper) v. Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions, [2002] EWHC 191 (Admin).
may be a useful starting point, in some cases, for diag-
nosis or choice of treatment pathway. However, clini-
cians should have the opportunity to assess, in some
respects at least, whether what may generally be true of
patients of a particular age is in fact true for the patient
in front of them. So too, in relation to the division of
mental health provision into age group-specialised ser-
vices, there seems no reason why, in most cases, choice
of the most appropriate service for the particular patient
cannot be assessed by the referring clinician or (in the
case of transfer between services) the existing care team.
Indeed this is the approach recommended by the Joint
Commissioning Panel for Mental Health, which notes
that older people should not be precluded from access-
ing services provided for working age adults where
assessment of their needs indicates that this would be
appropriate.89
3.2.3 Exceptionality
Another potentially important – and closely related –
consideration is that of exceptionality. Given that pro-
portionality requires a balancing between the aim of a
measure and the impact on those disadvantaged by it,
the possibility of making exceptions to a general rule for
individuals who can demonstrate a good reason for
doing so means that the harmful impacts of the rule may
be reduced.
A concern for making exceptions has not been evident
in the cases considering the justification of age limits in
employment law. Indeed in Seldon the Supreme Court
was asked to decide whether, in addition to having to
justify a general rule that discriminated directly on
grounds of age, an employer had to justify the applica-
tion of that rule to the particular applicant. The appli-
cant argued that even if the use of the mandatory retire-
ment age was in general a proportionate means of
achieving a legitimate aim, its application to him could
not be justified. The Court held, however, that ‘where it
is justified to have a general rule, then the existence of
that rule will usually justify the treatment which results
from it’. Requiring employers to justify the application
of rules to individual employees would, it was argued,
normally negate the value of having a rule in the first
place.90
The possibility of an exception being made has, how-
ever, been a relevant consideration in determining pro-
portionality under Article 14 of the ECHR. In AL (Ser-
bia), for example, it was one of the features that led the
Court to conclude that the government policy of using
family status to determine eligibility for indefinite leave
to remain was justified. The measure was proportionate
because, among other things, ‘it permitted compelling
89. Joint Commissioning Panel for Mental Health, Guidance for Commis-
sioners of Older People’s Mental Health Services (May 2013),
www.jcpmh.info (last visited July 2019).
90. Above n. 67, at 65 and 66.
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claims by those falling outside the policy to be recog-
nised and accommodated’.91
The relationship between exceptionality and propor-
tionality – and how these considerations may be applied
to the use of age barriers for access to healthcare –
therefore remains unclear. It seems at least that, while
not a requirement of proportionality, the existence of an
opportunity for individuals to make a case for being an
exception to the rule may be a relevant consideration in
any balancing exercise.
As public bodies, healthcare commissioners are already
under a public law duty not to fetter their discretion
through the strict application of a blanket rule (R v.
North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex p A, D & G,
[2001] 1 WLR 977). Rather, they are obliged to have
some mechanism whereby exceptions to the rule can be
made for patients who can demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. Accordingly, CCGs operate a system
whereby individuals who do not otherwise qualify for a
particular intervention my submit an individual funding
request (IFR) to seek treatment on the basis of excep-
tionality where they do not otherwise qualify for treat-
ment. Although there remains a lack of clear legal guid-
ance on what may amount to exceptional circum-
stances,92 commissioners tend to restrict these to clinical
factors only.
It is not known whether there have been IFRs that have
succeeded because an individual patient has shown that
they have exceptional circumstances in relation to an age
limit.93 It is not clear whether evidence showing that
– for example – the biological age of the patient is signif-
icantly different from their chronological age in relevant
respects would be sufficient to demonstrate exceptional-
ity. If so, it may provide an opportunity for women
denied IVF because of age to demonstrate that, as is
sometimes the case, their biological ovarian age differs
significantly from their chronological age.
In relation to screening services, it was seen that, in
some circumstances, screening may be available to those
not in the age group routinely invited, either where they
are able to self refer, or where a GP may refer on the
basis that the risk is higher for them than for others of
their age. While there is evidence that the take-up of
self-referral is low, in part because individuals may not
be aware of the option, these opportunities – at least if
adequately publicised – may again mitigate the impact
of the use of age limits and render their use more pro-
portionate as a result.
91. AL (Serbia) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008]
UKHL 42, at 3; See also R v. Entry Clearance Office ex parte Abu-
Gidary, [2000] 2000 WL 741931 QBD.
92. A. Ford, ‘The Concept of Exceptionality: A Legal Farce?’, 20 Medical
Law Review 304-336 (2012).
93. There has been one case reported in the press, but the basis of the suc-
cessful appeal was not reported. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/
womens-health/8965796/Couple-win-IVF-funding-battle-with-
NHS.html. See R v. Sheffield HA ex parte Searle, [1995] 25 BMLR 1 –
pre Equality Act 2010 – where a judicial review challenge to the applica-
tion of an age limit for IVF services and refusal to consider each case on
an individual basis, failed.
4 Conclusion
This article has aimed to assess, as far as is possible, the
compatibility of some uses of age in the allocation of
healthcare with the existing legal framework. It was seen
that age is still used as a proxy for a range of factors,
including need, risk and capacity to benefit. The analy-
sis suggests that, in most cases, these uses of age may be
legally justifiable. However, it suggests, in order to
ensure that the use of age is proportionate, that care
should be taken to ensure that it is evidence based and
as accurate as possible, is used consistently and is only
used where the opportunity for individual assessment is
unworkable. It is also important that meaningful provi-
sion exists for individuals to make a case for accessing
the healthcare in question even when they fall on the
wrong side of a limit.
Perhaps the most legally questionable example of the
use of age discussed previously is where clinicians use it
to determine treatment pathways for individual patients.
This may not be compatible with the law where it is
done for ‘paternalistic’ reasons and where, because of
the opportunity for assessment of and discussion with
the individual patient, the use of a patient’s chronologi-
cal age to determine access to treatment is less likely to
be proportionate. Further research to understand more
about when – and how – individual clinicians use chro-
nological age in decision-making would be welcome, not
least because it would help determine whether the cor-
relation identified between age and treatment offered is
in part a result of unlawful age discrimination.
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